WHAT HAPPENS NEXT FOR DEMOCRATS,
AN ANALYSIS
OF 2004 AND A COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE FUTURE
By: Mark Poloncarz
Date: January 17, 2005
The election of 2004 is over, and obituaries are being written for the Democratic Party. John Kerry’s defeat at the hands of George W. Bush, coupled with the losses sustained by Democrats in Congress, have led some commentators to call the 2004 election a mandate for conservative ideals. We are told that the nation is entering a new age of family values and a right-wing dominated agenda. To Democrats it seems that the values they believe in no longer matter; that they are becoming a fringe party in the American process. Those who say and believe so are wrong.
A Republican leaning newspaper described the Democratic Party after it lost a demoralizing presidential election as “a myth, a reminiscence, a voice from the tomb, an ancient, fishlike smell.” However, that quote was not used to describe the 2004 election, nor the elections in 2000, 1984, 1980 or even 1968. It was the election of 1860. The election of Abraham Lincoln left Democrats divided and a nation on the brink of the Civil War. Somehow the Democratic Party survived years in which it should have disappeared. It will survive 2004. It will not only survive but thrive. But it will only do so if Democrats stop whining about the loss and focus on how they can win in the future. Winning starts by playing an active role in all communities, whether they be in blue or red states. Elections are not won by having the most blogs on the Internet, the endorsement of a Hollywood star or a benefit concert by the hot new musical artist. They are won by having a message that resonates with the voting public and a ground game to get the voters out.
John Kerry did not lose because he was bad candidate, had a bad message or did not have the ground troops necessary to get out the vote. Some may question what Kerry’s message was at its heart, but it cannot be doubted that the Democratic Party had the best ground campaign in its history. There were more staffers and volunteers on the ground than in any prior year, and, of course, more money was spent on this election than in any in the past.
He lost because the Republicans did a better job of dictating the message that their voters wanted to hear and then they went out and made sure those voters actually cast a ballot. John Kerry would be the 44th president if the election were held only in the suburbs and urban areas. As will be shown later, Kerry not only won many of the same cities and suburbs as Al Gore did in 2000, but he expanded on Gore’s and Nader’s combined winning percentage. Yet even with this expanded democratic vote Kerry still lost, because Bush’s victory was won on the backs of his conservative base and the area democrats have ceded to republicans – the rural vote.
George W. Bush not only overwhelmingly defeated Kerry in rural America, which made up for his Kerry’s victories in the cities and suburbs, he won with a message that his voters wanted to hear. In addition to running a very negative campaign against Kerry and the Democrats in general, Bush and his campaign mastermind Karl Rove spread a message that made their supporters want to vote for him. What makes their strategy all the more impressive is that their effort did not start in 2004 or even 2003, but in the late 1980s. Bush and Rove early on identified a section of America that would respond to a certain message, one which but had not voted en mass in previous elections. Part of that non-electorate was the Christian Right, but the other portion could be more accurately characterized as the moral right. Not in a sense as the person identifying themselves as a member of the Christian Right, but that some of those same hot button family/moral issues matter to them as well. They identified and prepared a message that made these voters want to vote for Bush.
But identifying the voters and creating a message means nothing if you do not get the voters out on Election Day. In 2004 Bush and Rove had a message, you always knew were he stood on issues and that one of those issues was he was a protector of moral values, and then they got those voters out to vote. Not only did they vote but they wanted to vote for Bush because he was one of them.
Does this mean that it is going take years for Democrats to build a message, identify voters and then get the message out? No, because Democrats have core messages that voters identify with – economic justice, betterment of our economy, the provision of high quality health care to those who cannot afford it, protecting those who cannot provide for themselves, ensuring that we leave the land we walk on and the air we breathe in better condition for the next generations as it was passed on to us, always looking out for the common man and ensuring the dignity and respect of all.
What Democrats need to do is realize that the message of the Democratic Party, the party of Jefferson, Jackson, Wilson, FDR, Kennedy and Clinton, is the story of America. It is a story of picking ourselves up by our bootstraps, working as hard as you can, playing a part in your community and achieving the American Dream. But we know that not everybody has as fair a chance as others to reach out and grab that brass ring. Does the child of a single parent who works two part time jobs with no health insurance and attends a school with just a few computers and no arts programs compete on a level playing field with the children of privilege attending the best schools in the suburbs? Does it or should it matter if the child lives in the inner city or rural America. Ronald Reagan may have believed that the playing field was level, but liberals, Democrats, progressives or whatever we are called know that not only isn’t the field level but the fields are not even in the same county. And a majority of Americans know that as well.
That is why Democrats need to stop crying, pick themselves up off the mat and get back in the game. But to do so they need to know not only why Kerry lost, but how Democrats and progressives across the country can take back the soul of our nation by focusing on the issues that have always mattered to democrats, as well as most Americans, and then getting those votes out. If these lessons are learned then can be back on the road to taking back the White House, picking up seats in the Congress, and once again be the party of the America. Democrats are not dead, they may be wounded, but the Donkey is still alive and kicking. And if they want to win in 2006 and 2008 they need to start kicking the plan into gear and get the ground game going now.
2004
As coordinator for the John Kerry campaign in Erie County (Buffalo) and Western New York I was more intimately involved in the 2004 election than the usual volunteer or Democratic voter. My support for John Kerry started early, continued through election night, and still exists today. I always believed that Kerry would make a great president and still believe it. While this may skew my view of Kerry and his message, it also gave me an insight into what voters in western New York as well as north western Pennsylvania were thinking. These areas represent a microcosm of the United States of America: inner city, suburban, exurban, and rural America. And what those voters in this small corner of the country were thinking seems to coincide with what a majority of voters in the rest of America were saying, and as a result, how they voted.
These voters wanted a secure country, good jobs, affordable health care, and a peaceful but victorious way out of the war in Iraq. But for voters in rural western New York and Pennsylvania, they also wanted to live in a morally correct country. New York State went for John Kerry by 20 percentage points, primarily because of his huge victory margins in New York City, Albany and Buffalo, but he lost many rural counties by 30, 35 and even 40 points. In some regards the New York vote turned out to be no different than the critical swing state of Ohio, except that there is no city in Ohio that dominates its statewide vote like New York City does for the State of New York.
NBC News Washington Bureau Chief Tim Russert said the 2004 election would come down to “Ohio, Ohio, Ohio.” In the end he was correct: the winner of Ohio will be inaugurated president on January 20, 2005. In the final vote total certified by the Ohio Secretary of State on January 4, 2005, Bush captured 50.81% of the vote compared to Kerry’s total of 48.71%. . As described in Table 1, Bush picked up seven-tenths of a point from 2000, while Kerry picked up 2.4 points from Gore’s total, but actually lost one-tenth percent when you combine Gore’s and Nader’s 2000 vote totals.
Table 1
Comparison of Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 2,293,092 50.1%
Gore: 2,117,683 46.3%
Nader: 113,759 2.5%
2004 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 2,859,764 50.81%
Kerry: 2,741,165 48.71%
What makes Bush’s victory impressive is that he lost by very large margins in some of the major metropolitan areas of Ohio. For example, in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) Kerry won by over 218,000 votes - a thirty-four percentage point margin! In Lucas County (Toledo) Kerry won by 45,000 votes, a twenty point margin. Many commentators, including advisors in each campaign, thought that the key to victory in Ohio would lie in the City of Columbus and its surrounding suburbs in Franklin County. Kerry won that critical county, a community that has consistently leaned Republican for decades, by 8 percentage points and over 40,000 votes. While George W. Bush carried Hamilton County (Cincinnati), a traditional bastion of the Republican Party, his victory was only by 22,000 votes. In each of these counties not only did Kerry do better than Al Gore did in 2000, he bettered the combined 2000 vote of Gore and Nader.
For example, as shown in Table 2, in 2000 Bush defeated Gore by a little more than 11 percentage points. If you add Nader’s and Gore’s vote totals together Bush still won by 9 percentage points. However, in 2004 Kerry was able to reduce Bush’s victory to a little less than 5 ½ points. So he picked up approximately 3.5 percentage points compared to Gore’s and Nader’s combined 2000 vote deficiency.
Table 2
Comparison of Hamilton County, Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election (64.5 turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 204,175 54.0%
Gore: 161,578 42.7%
Nader: 9,222 2.4%
2004 Election (75.5% turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 222,616 52.5%
Kerry: 199,679 47.1%
In Franklin County (Columbus) Kerry’s increase in voting percentage is even more impressive. As described in Table 3, in 2000 Gore defeated Bush by 1 percentage point in Franklin County, and 3.6 points if you add Nader’s vote total to Gore’s. In 2004 Kerry defeated Bush by over 8 percentage points, a full 48,000 vote margin. The same result can be seen in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland).
Table 3
Comparison of Franklin County, Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 197,862 47.8%
Gore: 202,018 48.8%
Nader: 10,702 2.6%
2004 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 237,253 45.6%
Kerry: 285,801 53.7%
In 2000 in Cuyahoga County Gore defeated Bush by 29 points, 32 points if you add Nader’s vote totals. In 2004 Kerry defeated Bush by approximately 33.5 percentage points. Thus, Kerry did better than Gore and Nader combined vote in all the major metropolitan areas of Ohio.
Table 4
Comparison of Cuyahoga County, Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 192,099 33.4%
Gore: 359,913 62.6%
Nader: 16,956 2.9%
2004 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 221,600 32.9%
Kerry: 448,503 66.6%
If Kerry expanded on Gore’s and Nader’s vote totals from 2000 how did he lose? The answer to that question is the same as to why the early exit polls released on Election Day showed Kerry winning Ohio – the rural vote turned out for Bush in 2004 at a much greater percentage of vote than in 2000 and than the pollsters expected.
In Darke County, a small county in western Ohio bordering Indiana, Bush defeated Kerry with almost 70% of the vote: 69.6% to 29.8%, a 6 point increase in his percentage vote compared to 2000. Moreover, the turnout percentage in Darke County increased from 65.91% to 70.57%, and as shown in Table 5 almost all of those voters voted for Bush.
Table 5
Comparison of Darke County, Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election (65.91% turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 14,817 63.68%
Gore: 7,741 33.27%
Nader: 452 1.94%
2004 Election (70.57%)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 18,306 69.6%
Kerry: 7,846 29.8%
In Pickaway County in Southeastern Ohio the increase in voter turnout from 2000 to 2004 was even more amazing. In 2000 61% of registered voters voted, while in 2004 this number increased to 77%, an almost unheard of increase in vote of 16%, and as a result Bush was able to increase his vote total from 2000 to 2004 from 60% to 62%.
Table 6
Comparison of Pickaway County, Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election (61% turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 10,717 60%
Gore: 6,598 37%
Nader: 276 2%
2004 Election (77% turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 14,161 62%
Kerry: 8,579 38%
Whereas Kerry won Lucas County by 45,000, Bush offset that loss by winning Butler County in Southwestern Ohio by over 50,000 votes, which resulted in a 22 point victory. As evidenced by Table 7, in Butler County, a mostly rural county but also the home to Miami University, voter turnout increased from 63% in 2000 to 71% in 2004 and as a result Bush picked up two and half percentage points from his 2000 vote total. Kerry actually lost two-tenths of a point compared to Gore’s 2000 vote, and over 2 points if you combined about Gore’s and Nader’s vote total.
Table 7
Comparison of Butler County, Ohio Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election (63% turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 86,587 63.32%
Gore: 46,390 33.93%
Nader: 2,708 1.98%
2004 Election (71% turnout)
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 109,877 65.9%
Kerry: 56,243 33.7%
In Delaware County, a mostly rural county north of Columbus, Bush captured 66% of the vote in each election, which is impressive considering the voter turnout increased from 69.8% to 80.6%. Thus Bush was able to offset his losses in the solidly Democratic northern cities of Cleveland and Toledo and the critical metropolitan region of Columbus by increasing his vote totals in the mostly rural counties of central and southern counties.
Western New York
The vote in Western New York in some ways paralleled the vote in Ohio in that Kerry won easily in urban New York, while Bush won handily in rural New York. It is often said that Erie County is a bell-weather county in New York State – as goes Erie County so goes New York. While there was no real question as to whether Kerry would win New York State, there was a question as to how Kerry would do in Erie County.
Erie County, with a population of little less than one million, is the home of the City of Buffalo and has a Democratic enrollment edge over Republicans by about 100,000. Yet it is also the home of large suburban, exurban and rural voters and those voters often influence county wide elections. For example, while the Democrats hold a slim 8-7 advantage over Republicans in the County Legislature, Erie County is governed by a Republican County Executive, Comptroller and Sheriff. So while a Kerry victory in Erie County was expected, it was not guaranteed.
When the final vote was counted John Kerry won by 15 percentage points with 56.4% of the vote compared to 41.4% for Bush and 2% for Nader, with a 73% voter turnout. This may have been the result from a larger than usual turnout in the City of Buffalo due to a very competitive race for an open seat in New York’s 27th Congressional District.
Though Kerry won Erie County fairly comfortably he was not able to increase Gore’s 2000 winning percentage over President Bush. As shown in Table 8, in 2000 Gore won 56.5% of the vote compared to Bush’s 37.7% and Nader’s 4.3. Thus Gore defeated Bush by nearly 20 points and 24 points if you were to add Nader’s votes as a “Progressive/Democratic” vote total. In 2004 Kerry defeated Bush by 15 points, 17 points if you include Nader’s vote total. So while Kerry was able to equal Gore’s 2000 percentage vote total, 56.4 % to 56.5%, he was not able to increase the “Democratic” winning percentage. Instead, Bush increased his percentage of the vote from 37.7% in 2000 to 41.4% in 2004.
Table 8
Comparison of Erie County, New York Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 160,176 37.7%
Gore: 240,176 56.5%
Nader: 18,166 4.3%
2004 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 184,423 41.4%
Kerry: 251,090 56.4%
Nader: 7,459 2.0%
The same can be seen in other counties in western New York. In Niagara County, home to the City of Niagara Falls but also to vast rural towns and villages, while Kerry won by the smallest of margins, 49.3% to 48.8%, Bush actually picked up 5 points compared to his vote total in 2000. As shown in Table 9, Kerry’s popular vote total in Niagara County actually decreased compared to Gore’s in 2000 by about 180 votes, while Bush picked up over 6,000 new votes, meaning Bush actually picked up support from almost every new voter compared to 2000.
Table 9
Comparison of Niagara County, New York Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 40,952 43.9%
Gore: 47,781 51.2%
Nader: 3,257 3.4%
2004 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 47,141 48.8%
Kerry: 47,602 49.3%
In Chautauqua County, a rural county that has seen its formerly strong furniture industry reduced to a shadow of its self and where Senator John Edwards prepared for the vice-presidential debate, Bush defeated Kerry by 8.5 points – 53.2% to 44.7%. As shown in Table 10, in 2000 Bush won Chautauqua County by almost 3 points, 49.1% to 46.3 for Gore and 3.2% for Nader. Thus if you added Gore’s and Nader’s 2000 vote totals together, Bush actually lost in 2000 to the combined “Progressive/Democratic” vote 49.5% to 49.1%.
Table 10
Comparison of Chautauqua County, New York Vote Totals 2000 – 2004
2000 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 26,955 49.1%
Gore: 25,435 46.3%
Nader: 1,758 3.2%
2004 Election
Votes % of Vote
Bush: 32,434 53.2%
Kerry: 27,257 44.7%
How was it that Kerry lost by such a large margin in Chautauqua County compared to the 2000 vote? Kerry actually received a similar vote total as Gore and Nader’s combined 2000 vote: 27,257 to 27,193. However, Bush increased his vote total from 26,955 to 32,434. Thus Bush picked up 5,439 votes in an economically depressed, yet conservative leaning county. This increase in Bush’s Chautauqua County vote is similar to Bush increase in the rural counties of Ohio. Kerry did not so much as lose the “Democratic/Progressive” vote as Bush increased his vote among those who did not vote in 2000.
Thus, in both Ohio and western New York Kerry “carried” the urban and suburban areas, but lost ground in rural communities. The same goes for the rest of America’s heartland – Bush picked up thousands of votes in rural America compared to his 2000 vote total, and that increase carried him to victory on Election Day.
What’s Next – Where Do Democrats Go From Here?
As a result of the 2004 election the Democratic Party, as well as democrats, liberals and progressives across the nation are asking questions about what direction the party should head next? Should the party become a centrist/moderate party, similar to what occurred during the Clinton years, or should it head further to the left to shore up its base? Is it the party of the left, the urban centers, middle-America (whatever that may mean), the young, the old, the haves or have-nots? While in essence the Democratic Party is all of the above, before Democrats can truly answer that basic question they have to identify who they represent, and maybe more importantly, who identifies as Democrats.
For years the Democratic Party’s stronghold consisted of the inner city vote, labor unions and the working poor. This combination of inner city strength with suburban and rural blue collar votes helped the Democrats retain Congress for over 40 years, and ensured victories for Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s. During this period Democrats could be counted to on to represent those who could not represent themselves, and in turn those people identified themselves with the Democratic Party.
Yet the past 40 years have seen a shift in party identification, which in turn has resulted in the Republican majority in Washington, D.C. we see today. During that period many of those so called Democrats shifted allegiance, if not in name, at least in vote. The election of Ronald Reagan resulted in part from the so-called “Reagan Democrats” who switched their consistent democratic vote to the conservative Republican. The South, a democratic stronghold since before the Civil War, became the home to “Dixiecrats,” Democrats in name who vote consistently for Republicans.
Until at least this election, it is safe to say that many liberals believed that most Americans identified themselves more as liberals than as conservatives. Yet exit polls from this past election reveal that 34% of those who voted identify themselves as conservative, 21% liberal and 45% as moderate. However, the change in voter identification is not enough to explain the voting result in 2000 and 2004. In 2004 Republicans were able to cultivate votes in rural America that in some ways did not exist before. It appears that the Republican Party was able to draw out votes from rural America by focusing on an “us v. them” mentality – Republicans represent the heartland while Democrats represent Hollywood and the liberals on the East Coast.
While the data from the 2004 election is still being analyzed, there is no doubt that at least one-third, and maybe even 40%, of those who voted for George W. Bush listed moral values as a primary reason for the vote. Thus their vote was not based on the War in Iraq, the lack of affordable healthcare nor the economy of the country, but on a belief that basic American values were at stake, and that Republicans could best respond to this moral crisis. Democrats may laugh at voters who support the president because he sticks with his gut instinct, but a majority of American voters will often cast a ballot based on instinct rather than policy.
Some of those naming moral values as a primary concern were undoubtedly voting pro-life and/or anti-gay marriage, but others were voting based upon a supposed degradation of society. From Janet Jackson’s Super Bowl wardrobe “malfunction” to an over abundance of sex and violence in the media, these voters cast a ballot for a candidate who stressed his Christian values and criticized those who supposedly were a cancer on our society. This vote may not have been anti-Kerry (though a good portion of it was), but a vote for a man and a party that identified itself with small town values and rural America.
During the past 40 years national Democratic leaders focused their efforts on turning out their base of inner-city and union vote while Republicans focused on the suburbs and small town America. While Democrats have made inroads into suburban voters, they but all have abandoned rural America to the republicans. Though the Kerry campaign sent organizers into every community in each swing state, you can’t place a democratic organizer into a rural community three months before an election and expect to do well, just as the Republicans could not expect to do well in urban America with a similar strategy. This was not a failure of the Kerry campaign, but of the Democratic Party in letting republicans build a structure in these communities for 40 years, and then watching as republicans identify what democrats stand for in these communities.
Being a Democrat does not make you pro-abortion or anti-marriage, but unfortunately that is the message being peddled by conservatives. Democrats need to have a strong structure in place in these communities so that voters know what democrats represent. We can win in rural America as long as we have a message that voters can identify with. This was evident in 2004.
For example, in Montana, a state Bush won handily 59% to 38.5%, Democrats captured the Governor’s office and now hold a majority in both houses of its legislative body. The Democratic Party’s candidate, and now Governor, Brian Schweitzer defeated the Republican Secretary of State Bob Brown 50% to 46% by capturing over 50,000 more votes than Kerry received. By all accounts Schweitzer ran a campaign based on core “Montana values” including being pro-gun. Yet he also ran on key democratic values, showing that a democrat can win a statewide race in a supposedly “blood red” state.
The same goes for North Dakota. While George W. Bush won quite easily (just like Montana, Kerry never campaigned there), Democratic Senator Byron Dorgan was reelected with a greater margin of victory than Bush over Kerry. Dorgan ran as an advocate for North Dakotans, while at the same time standing on his record as a strong defender of Democratic Party ideals.
Schweitzer’s and Dorgan’s victories just go to show that Democrats can win a statewide race in a rural “red” state. The same goes for rural counties in strong blue states. While Chautauqua County New York might have gone to Bush, it is governed by a popular Democratic County Executive in Mark Thomas.
The Democratic Party must remind itself that it represents America’s heartland just as much as Republicans do. It is the party that advocates a working minimum wage , providing high quality healthcare for more than those who can just afford it, securing a quality education regardless of where you live, ensuring our environment is never left to the whims of big business, protecting the benefits that our seniors worked so hard for throughout their lives, and, contrary to conservative commentators, that it will always provide for a strong defense of our nation.
It also must fight the notion that conservative Republicans hold a stranglehold on all moral values. The party and progressives in general must stress to voters that being a moral person means more than voting for anti-gay marriage measures and being pro-life. The Democratic Party must emphasize that in addition to its basic principles it represents moral values that all Americans believe in: eradicating poverty, promoting humanity through the guaranteeing of basic human rights here and around the globe, advancing the family unit no matter its form, and promoting a fair economic system that protects the individual from the power brokers who try to rig the system to their benefit.
To win in red states in a presidential election the Democratic Party needs to do more than throw a field coordinator in a rural district a few months before the election to start espousing these ideals. It needs to start now to build its party structure from the bottom up. The party needs to have solid state and county wide organizations in place across the nation regardless of how fruitless the effort might appear. This begins by fielding legitimate candidates for all races. No one gave the democrats much chance of capturing the Montana Governor’s race in 2004, yet because of a quality candidate focusing on local issues they not only captured that office but now control the state legislature as well. Having Democrats in local offices is a key to opening up a red state to a democratic candidate.
And this must be a 50 state strategy. The emphasis on presidential candidates campaigning only in “swing states” seems to have evolved during the past 30 years. It wasn’t always this way. During the 1932 election campaign Franklin Delano Roosevelt, against the recommendations of his advisers, campaigned in 41 out of the then 48 states. Failure to campaign in a majority of the states just lets the Republican Party increase its hold on these states. The Democratic candidate may not win many of these states, but he, or eventually she, could pick up a few and cause the next republican presidential candidate to spend important resources in “safe” states that could be used elsewhere.
While many look for an answer in the form of a magic elixir, no such potion exists. Democrats need to look themselves in the mirror and know that they can win, they almost won in 2004, but it will take hard work in rural areas that have not been a harvest of democratic votes for some time. This will not happen overnight, and there is no guarantee it will happen in 4 years. But Democrats must stress their message of progressive Americanism in unfamiliar territory. This does not mean changing platforms, just starting to stress the democratic values that all Americans hold dear in an area where values matter more than endless policy debates. Because it’s time we stop debating the direction to take, focus on the road ahead, and hit the ground running towards 2006 and 2008 by focusing not just on our base, but all America.
© Mark C. Poloncarz, 2005.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not represent those of the WNY Coalition for Progress.
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